A few days into the news that the Ukrainian army has recaptured territorities from the Russian occupying forces, Kyiv’s counteroffensive still has plenty to intrigue us. Announced in autumn 2022, this summer 2023 campaign has been a long time coming. So much so that it almost came to seem like Godot in Samuel Beckett’s play: its arrival seemed imminent, but never came. At the beginning of June 2023, it appears to have finally averted the “Godot curse”: the Russian Ministry of Defence, then Kyiv officials, have admitted that it has indeed begun.
The reason why Ukraine has been trumpeting about this large-scale operation for so long, without it actually materialising, is that, at the tactical level, it is essential to keep the details of the military action vague so that it can benefit from the element of surprise. However, a number of questions remain about this counteroffensive.
Why this summer and not later? After all, waiting a little further could have enabled the Ukrainian army forces to enjoy the military equipment promised by the West. Sanctions, as well as the sheer weight of an occupation that now spans 20% of the Ukrainian territory, could have further sunk the Russian war effort.
Secondly, and most importantly, what are Kyiv’s strategic objectives? Is it to seek a decisive victory? Or is it to prepare the ground for negotiations in which Ukraine would enter from a position of strength? By speculating on the ‘when’ and ‘where’ of these operations, we may have neglected to consider the ‘why’.
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